We introduce the problem of Multi-Input Functional Encryption, where a secret key SK f can correspond to an n-ary function f that takes multiple ciphertexts as input. Multi-input functional encryption is a general tool for computing on encrypting data which allows for mining aggregate information from several different data sources (rather than just a single source as in single input functional encryption). We show wide applications of this primitive to running SQL queries over encrypted database, non-interactive differentially private data release, delegation of computation, etc.
Introduction
Traditionally, encryption has been used to secure a communication channel between a unique sender-receiver pair. In recent years, however, our networked world has opened up a large number of new usage scenarios for encryption. For example, a single piece of encrypted data, perhaps stored in an untrusted cloud, may need to be used in different ways by different users. To address this issue, the notion of functional encryption (FE) was developed in a sequence of works [SW05, GPSW06, BW07, KSW08, LOS + 10, BSW11, O'N10]. In functional encryption, the owner of the master secret key MSK can create a secret key SK f for any function f from a family F. Given any ciphertext CT with underlying plaintext x, using SK f a user can efficiently compute f (x). The security of FE requires that the adversary "does not learn anything" about x, other than the computation result f (x).
How to define "does not learn anything about" x is a fascinating question which has been addressed by a number of papers, with general formal definitions first appearing in [BSW11, O'N10] . The definitions range from requiring a strict simulation of the view of the adversary, which enlarges the range of applications, but has been shown to either necessitate a secret key whose size grows with the number of ciphertexts that will ever be released [BSW11, BO13] (or a ciphertext whose size grows with the number of functions for which secret keys will ever be released [AGVW13, CIJ + 13]), to an indistinguishability of ciphertexts requirement which supports the release of an unbounded number of function keys and ciphertexts.
Functional encryption seems to offer the perfect non-interactive solution to many problems which arise in the context of delegating services to outside servers. A typical example is the delegation of spam filtering to an outside server as follows: Alice publishes her public key online and gives the spam filter a key for the filtering function; users sending email to Alice will encrypt the email with her public key. The spam filter can now determine by itself, for each email, whether to pass it along to Alice's mailbox or to deem it as spam, but without ever learning anything else about Alice's email. This example inherently requires computing a function f on a single ciphertext.
Multi-Input Functional Encryption. It is less clear, however, how to define or achieve functional encryption in the context of computing a function defined over multiple plaintexts given their corresponding ciphertexts, or further, given their ciphertexts each encrypted under a different key. Yet, these settings, which we formalize as Multi-Input Functional Encryption (MI-FE), encompass a vast landscape of applications, going way beyond delegating computation to an untrusted server or cloud. Multi-input functional is a very general tool for computing on encrypting data, which allows for mining aggregate information from several different data sources (rather than just a single source as in single input functional encryption).
Let us begin by clarifying the setting of Multi-Input Functional Encryption: Let f be an n-ary function where n > 1 can be a polynomial in the security parameter. In MI-FE, the owner of a master secret key MSK can derive special keys SK f whose knowledge enables the computation of f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) from n ciphertexts CT 1 , . . . , CT n of underlying messages x 1 , . . . , x n with respect to the same master secret key MSK. We allow the different ciphertexts c i to be each encrypted under a different encryption key EK i to capture the setting in which each ciphertext was generated by an entirely different party.
Let us illustrate a few settings that illustrate the applicability of MI-FE.
Example 1: Running SQL Queries on Encrypted Database. Suppose we have an encrypted database. A natural goal in this scenario would be to allow a party Alice to perform a certain class of general SQL queries over this database (e.g., Alice may only be authorized to access records created on a certain date). If we use ordinary functional encryption, Alice would need to obtain a separate secret key for every possible valid SQL query, a potentially exponentially large set. Multi-input functional encryption allows us to address this problem in a flexible way. We highlight two aspects of how MI-FE can apply to this example:
• Let f be the function where f (Q, x) first checks if Q is a valid SQL query from the allowed class, and if so f (Q, x) is the output of the query Q on the database x. Now, if we give the secret key SK f and the encryption key EK 1 to Alice, then Alice can choose a valid query Q and encrypt it under her encryption key EK 1 to obtain ciphertext CT 1 . Then she could use her secret key SK f on ciphertexts CT 1 and CT 2 , where CT 2 is the encrypted database, to obtain the results of the SQL query.
• Furthermore, if the database is dynamic (rather than static) with individual entries being added, modified, or, deleted, the most natural way to build such a database would be to have different ciphertexts for each entry in the database. In this case, for a database of size n, we could let f be an (n + 1)-ary function where f (Q, x 1 , . . . , x n ) is the result of a (valid) SQL query Q on the database (x 1 , . . . , x n ).
Example 2: Computing over Encrypted Data Stream. Suppose ciphertexts correspond to a stream of encrypted phone calls (or video frames produced by surveillance cameras), produced separately by several different devices. Law enforcement agencies may require the ability to run algorithms which check the calls or videos for suspicious activities (these algorithms need to analyze sequences of calls or frames rather than individual calls/frames) in which case (and only in this case) court orders can be obtained to decrypt the phone calls (or videos) in their entirety.
Here, the need is to compute a function f (p 1 , . . . , p n ) where p i is the i'th phone call, encrypted to form the ciphertext c i . More generally, suppose ciphertexts c 1 , . . . , c n correspond to a list of encrypted inputs to some algorithm, e.g. a list of edges x 1 , . . . , x n in a graph for a routing algorithm f . Then, we need to run the algorithm f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) across multiple ciphertexts. It is likely that this type of algorithm would be the rule rather than the exception in the context of algorithms run over large inputs.
Example 3: Non-Interactive Differentially Private Data Release. Suppose there are several hospitals each of which holds a collection of individual blood samples. They would like to participate in clinical trials performed by various researchers. The hospitals cannot simply release the blood samples records because of various patient privacy laws. However, the hospitals are willing to allow a clinical study researcher to compute an aggregate function f over multiple samples x i to learn y = f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) as long as f achieves a sufficient level of privacy.
While such a scenario is addressed by differential privacy [DMNS06] , existing solutions require each hospital to interact with the researcher in every trial (potentially via a multiparty computation protocol when several hospitals are involved). Indeed, it is known that non-cryptographic methods for allowing the hospitals to non-interactively prepare their records in a way that would later allow for meaningful and diverse research studies must incur high accuracy loss [DNR + 09].
Multi-input functional encryption can address this problem by having the hospitals encrypt the samples x i to obtain ciphertexts CT i , and publish all the ciphertexts. This step can be performed by the hospitals non-interactively before any research trial f is decided (in contrast to the standard differential-privacy setting where f is decided upon first and then the "differentially private" information collection algorithm takes place). Later, a researcher who wishes to compute an algorithm f (that is guaranteed to provide sufficient privacy) would be given a secret key SK f (potentially by a trusted agency such as the government) that she can use to obtain the output of her algorithm on the blood samples. In this manner, we can obtain high accuracy while still guaranteeing good (computational) privacy.
We remark that this example requires MI-FE to support randomized functionalities. Our positive results, discussed later, handle this case.
Example 4: Multi-client Delegation of Computation. In a multi-client delegation scheme [CKKC13] , multiple weak clients C 1 , . . . , C n wish to jointly delegate the computation of an nary function f on their inputs x 1 , . . . , x n to a computationally powerful server. The efficiency requirement of a delegation scheme is that the computation of the clients should be independent of the size of f . From a security viewpoint, we require that a dishonest server should not be able to convince the (honest) clients on an incorrect output.
Multi-input functional encryption provides a natural solution to this problem similar to how single-input functional encryption provides a solution for single-client delegation of computation [PRV12, GVW13, GGH + 13b, GKP + 13b, GGH + 13a]. Details of this are provided in Section 1.1.3.
Our Goal. As these examples illustrate, extending the scope of functional encryption to address functions defined over multiple ciphertexts can be highly beneficial. In short, it could provide a non-interactive method to compute n-ary functions on encrypted inputs (possibly by different parties), analogously to interactive multi-party secure computations defined over multiple inputs held by n different parties.
Extending functional encryption to address the multi-input setting is the focus of this work.
This paper
This paper is dedicated to the study of multi-input functional encryption, starting with formalizations of security. We provide both feasibility results and negative results with respect to different definitions of security. Following the single-input setting, we consider two notions of security, namely, indistinguishability-based security (or IND security for short) and simulationbased security (or SIM security for short).
Indistinguishability-based Security
We start by considering the notion of indistinguishability-based security for functional encryption for n-ary functions: Informally speaking, in IND security for MI-FE, we consider a game between a judge and an adversary. First, the judge generates the master secret key MSK, n encryption keys {EK 1 , . . . , EK n } and gives to the adversary a subset of the encryption keys (chosen by the adversary). Then the adversary can request any number of secret keys SK f for functions f of her choice. Next, the adversary declares two "challenge vectors" X 0 and X 1 , where every
The judge chooses a bit b at random, and for each j ∈ [n], the judge encrypts every element x b i,j of X b i (for every i) using encryption key EK j to obtain a tuple of "challenge ciphertexts" CT, which is given to the adversary. After this, the adversary can again request any number of secret keys SK f for functions f of her choice. Finally, the adversary has to guess the bit b that the judge chose.
If the adversary has requested a secret key for any function f such that there exist splitting input vectors y 0 and y 1 that satisfy the following two properties:
1. For every j ∈ [n], either ∃i such that y b j ∈ X b i or the adversary has EK j , and 2. f ( y 0 ) = f ( y 1 ), then the adversary loses the game -because the legitimate functionalities that he has access to already allow him to distinguish between the scenario where b = 0 and b = 1. If the adversary never queries a secret key for such a function but nevertheless guesses b correctly, we say that she wins. The IND security definition requires that the adversary's probability of winning be at most negligibly greater than 1 2 . This definition generalizes the indistinguishability-based definition of (single-input) functional encryption, which was historically the first security notion considered for functional encryption [SW05] . Informally speaking, this definition captures an information-theoretic flavor of security, where the adversary should not learn anything beyond what is information-theoretically revealed by the function outputs it can obtain.
With regards to IND-secure MI-FE, we obtain the following results:
IND-secure MI-FE from Indistinguishability Obfuscation. Assume the existence of an indistinguishability obfuscator [BGI + 01] for general circuits (the first candidate construction for the same was recently put forward by [GGH + 13a]) and one-way functions, we provide a construction for IND-secure MI-FE for general circuits for any polynomial-size challenge vectors, with any subset of encryption keys given to the adversary. Furthermore, our construction has security when the adversary can obtain any unbounded polynomial number of secret keys SK f . We prove the security in the selective model, where where the adversary must begin by declaring the challenge vectors. By using complexity leveraging (and thereby assuming sub-exponentially secure indistinguishability obfuscation and sub-exponentially secure one-way functions, we can achieve full security in a standard manner.
Compact IND-secure MI-FE from Differing-Inputs Obfuscation. Our first construction only supports challenge vectors with an a priori fixed (polynomial) size q. In particular, the size of the encryption keys and ciphertexts in the scheme grows with q. Towards this end, assuming the existence of the stronger notion of differing-inputs obfuscation [BGI + 01] and oneway functions, we provide a second construction for IND secure MI-FE with "compact" keys and ciphertexts, i.e., the size of the keys and ciphertexts in the scheme is independent of q. Further, we directly prove full security of our scheme against adversaries that know any subset of encryption keys and an unbounded polynomial number of secret keys SK f .
IND-secure MI-FE implies Indistinguishability
Obfuscation. Finally, we show that the existence of IND-secure MI-FE for general circuits implies the existence of an indistinguishability obfuscator for general circuits, even when:
1. The MI-FE scheme is only secure against adversaries that can obtain a single secret key.
2. The adversary does not know any encryption keys, i.e., the MI-FE scheme is a secret-key scheme.
This stands in stark contrast to the single-input setting, where [SS10] showed how to obtain single-key secure (single input) functional encryption for all circuits, under only the assumption that public-key encryption exists. Indeed, further research in single-key security for functional encryption has largely focused on efficiency issues [GKP + 13b, GKP + 13a] such as succinctness of ciphertexts, that enable new applications. In the setting of multi-input security, in contrast, even single key security must rely on the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation.
Simulation-based security
In simulation-based security, informally speaking, we require that every adversary can be simulated using only oracle access to the functions f for which the adversary obtains secret keys, even when it can obtain a set of "challenge" ciphertexts corresponding to unknown plaintexts -about which the simulator can only learn information by querying the function f at these unknown plaintexts. We highlight two natural settings for the study of SIM-secure MI-FE: (1) the setting where an adversary has access to an encryption key (analogous to the public-key setting), and (2) the setting where the adversary does not have access to any encryption keys (analogous to the secret key setting). The security guarantees which are achievable in these settings will be vastly different as illustrated below. Several works [BSW11, AGVW13, BO13, CIJ + 13] have shown limitations on parameters with respect to which SIM security can be achieved for single-input functional encryption. For multi-input functional encryption, due to the connection to obfuscation discussed above, the situation for SIM security is more problematic. We provide the following results for SIM-secure MI-FE: SIM-secure MI-FE implies Virtual Black-Box Obfuscation. We first show that SIM-secure MI-FE implies virtual black-box (VBB) obfuscation in various settings. Specifically, we show:
1. If there exists a secret-key MI-FE scheme for general circuits that achieves SIM security against adversaries that request: (a) a single key for a general function f and (b) a set of challenge ciphertexts that can (informally speaking) form a super-polynomial number of potential inputs to f , then VBB obfuscation must be possible for general circuits.
2. If there exists an MI-FE scheme for 2-ary functions that achieves SIM security against adversaries that request: (a) a single key for a 2-ary function, and (b) one of the two encryption keys and one challenge ciphertext, then VBB obfuscation must be possible for general circuits.
Since VBB obfuscation is known to be impossible for general circuits [BGI + 01], this yields us impossibility results for SIM-secure MI-FE beyond those known in the single-input setting. See Section 6 for details.
SIM-secure Secret-Key MI-FE against Unbounded Collusions. In light of these negative results, the only hope for obtaining a positive result lies in a situation where: (a) no encryption keys are given to the adversary, and (b) the challenge ciphertexts given to the adversary can only form a polynomial number of potential inputs to valid functions. Towards this end, assuming one-way functions and indistinguishability obfuscation, for any fixed polynomial bound q on the size of challenge plaintexts, we give a construction for SIMsecure secret-key MI-FE for general circuits against adversaries that can obtain an unbounded polynomial number of secret keys SK f after obtaining the challenge ciphertexts. The size of the encryption keys and ciphertexts in this scheme grows with q.
We also provide another construction based on one-way functions and differing-inputs obfuscation that achieves the same security guarantees as above. The encryption keys and ciphertexts in this scheme are "compact", i.e., their sizes are independent of q.
Extensions and Applications
MI-FE for Randomized Functions. Very recently, Goyal et al. [GJKS13] first studied the question of constructing single-input functional encryption schemes for randomized functionalities. By building on their techniques, we show how to extend our positive results to handle general n-ary randomized functionalities. In particular, this allows us to obtain a non-interactive computationally differentially private mechanism, as discussed earlier. ] provide constructions of single-input functional encryption for turing machines against an unbounded polynomial number of key queries. We observe that their techniques can be leveraged to extend our results to MI-FE for turing machines, thereby achieving input-specific running times. The resulting construction would inherit from these works the underlying assumptions of differing-inputs obfuscation, succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (SNARK) [BCCT12] , fully-homomorphic encryption [Gen09] and collisionresistant hash functions. We omit the details from this manuscript and refer the reader to [ABG + 13, BCP13].
MI-FE for
Hierarchical MI-FE. The notion of hierarchical identity-based and attribute-based encryption is well studied in the literature (see e.g., [GS02, BW06, LOS + 10]). In the context of (single-input) functional encryption, this problem is stated as follows: We require that the owner of a secret key SK f can derive new keys corresponding to any function g that can defined as a composition of f on f (i.e., f • f ) for some function f .
Recently, [ABG + 13] observe that the construction [GGH + 13a] is already flexible enough to yield a hierarchical (single-input) functional encryption scheme. We note that the same ideas carry over to our constructions of MI-FE. We refer the reader to [ABG + 13] for details.
Multi-Client Delegation of Computation. Here we briefly discuss how an MI-FE scheme provides a solution for multi-client delegation of computation. We follow the approach of Parno et al. [PRV12] , adapted to the multi-client setting. Given an MI-FE scheme, the clients first participate in a pre-processing phase where they jointly compute two pairs of master secret and encryption keys (MSK 1 , EK 1 ), (MSK 2 , EK 2 ) and random values (r 1 , r 2 ). Let f be the function that the clients wish to delegate. The clients use MSK 1 to compute a secret key SK g for a function g that takes as input n tuples (x 1 , r), . . . , (x n , r) and outputs r if f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 1. Similarly, the clients use MSK 2 to compute a secret keySK g for the functionḡ that is the same as g except that it outputs r if f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 0. While these are computationally expensive operations, note that this phase is executed only once. The keys SK g andSK g are sent over to the worker.
Later, in an "online" phase, when the clients wish to compute f on a set of inputs x 1 , . . . , x n , each client C i sends over encryption of (x 1 , r 1 ) under key MPK 1 and (x 1 , r 2 ) under MPK 2 to the worker. Now, from the properties of the MI-FE scheme, it follows that if f (x 1 , . . . , x n ), then the server would obtain r 1 using SK g and ⊥ usingSK g and no information about r 2 (and vice-versa, if f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 0). Thus, r 1 provides a proof of the fact that the function output is 1. 1 The main advantage of this approach is that the online phase is non-intractive: each client can execute the online phase independently of the other clients, without any interaction.
Our Techniques
We have several results in this work, but to provide a flavor of the kind of difficulties that arise in the MI-FE setting, we now discuss some of the issues that we deal with in the context of our positive result for IND-secure MI-FE. (We note that similar issues arise in our positive results for SIM-secure MI-FE.)
The starting point for our construction and analysis is the recent single-input functional encryption scheme for general circuits based on indistinguishability obfuscation due to [GGH + 13a]. However, the central issue that we must deal with is one that does not arise in their context: Recall that in the indistinguishability security game, the adversary is allowed to get secret keys for any function f , as long as this function does not "split" the challenge vectors X 0 and X 1 . That is, as long as it is not the case that there exist vectors of plaintexts x 0 and x 1 where for every i ∈ [n], either there exists j such that x b i ∈ X b j or the adversary has EK i , such that f (x 0 ) = f (x 1 ). A crucial point here is what happens for an index i where the adversary does not have EK i . Let us consider an example with a 3-ary function, where the adversary has EK 1 , but neither EK 2 nor EK 3 .
Suppose the challenge ciphertexts (CT 1 , CT 2 , CT 3 ) are encryptions of either (y 0 1 , y 0 2 , y 0 3 ) or (y 1 1 , y 1 2 , y 1 3 ). Now, any function f that the adversary queries is required to be such that f (·, y 0 2 , y 0 3 ) ≡ f (·, y 1 2 , y 1 3 ) and f (y 0 1 , y 0 2 , y 0 3 ) = f (y 1 1 , y 1 2 , y 1 3 ). However, there may exist an input plaintext (say) z such that f (y 0 1 , y 0 2 , z) = f (y 1 1 , y 1 2 , z). This is not "supposed" to be a problem because the adversary does not have EK 3 , and therefore it cannot actually query f with z as its third argument.
However, in the obfuscation-based approach to functional encryption of [GGH + 13a] that we build on, the secret key for f is essentially built on top of an obfuscation of f . Let CT * denote an encryption of z w.r.t. EK 3 . Then, informally speaking, in one of our hybrid experiments, we will need to move from an obfuscation that on input (CT 1 , CT 2 , CT * ) would yield the output f (y 0 1 , y 0 2 , z) to another obfuscation that on the same input would yield the output f (y 1 1 , y 1 2 , z). Again, while an adversary may not be able explicitly perform such a decryption query, since we are building upon indistinguishability obfuscation -which only guarantees that obfuscations of circuits that implement identical functions are indistinguishable -such a hybrid change would not be indistinguishable since we know that f (y 0 1 , y 0 2 , z) = f (y 1 1 , y 1 2 , z) are not identical. (We remark that we must address this issue even when using differing-inputs obfuscation in order to obtain a formal contradiction.)
Solving this problem is the core technical aspect of our constructions and their analysis. At a very high level, we address this problem by introducing a new "flag" value that can change the nature of the function f that we are obfuscating to "disable" all plaintexts except for the ones that are in the challenge vectors. We describe the details and our analysis in Section 4.
Related Works
Single-input Functional Encryption. The notion of (single-input) functional encryption was developed in a sequence of works [SW05, GPSW06, BW07, KSW08, LOS + 10, BSW11, O'N10]. For general functions, [SS10] first showed how to obtain single-key SIM-secure FE based on standard public-key encryption. Gorbunov et al [GVW12] showed how to obtain SIM-secure FE for general circuits for a polynomially bounded number of (non-adaptive) key queries, based on public-key encryption and pseudorandom generators in Order-Preserving Encryption. The notion of order-preserving encryption was introduced by Boldyreva et al. [BCLO09] . Very roughly, in an order-preserving encryption scheme, for any two plaintexts x 1 and x 2 such that x 1 > x 2 , the encryptions of x 1 and x 2 must also satisfy the same order relationship. Thus, given two ciphertexts CT 1 and CT 2 , one can simply compare them to (publicly) determine the order relationship between their underlying plaintexts.
Positive results for order-preserving encryption were given by [BCLO09, BCO11] . These results, however, achieve very weak security guarantees (in particular, they show that an orderpreserving encryption scheme cannot achieve IND security). We note that one can cast the problem of computing order relationships between (encrypted) plaintexts as multi-input function encryption for comparison functionality. Specifically, instead of requiring that ciphertexts obey the same order relationship as their underlying plaintexts, we can now release secret keys to enable the computation of order relationship between encrypted plaintexts. This allows us to achieve IND security as well as SIM security, both of which provide much stronger guarantees than [BCLO09, BCO11] . Indeed, achieving stronger security guarantees in this context was left as an open problem by [BCLO09, BCO11] .
Property-Preserving Encryption. Recently, Pandey and Rouselakis [PR12] studied the problem of property-preserving encryption as a generalization of order-preserving encryption. As above, we note that this problem can be viewed as a multi-input functional encryption, where the function family is determined by the class of properties that one wishes to support. Again, we note that the security definitions considered in [PR12] are weaker than what we consider in this work. In particular, this is because we do not require the ciphertexts to satisfy the same property as their underlying plaintexts; instead in our setting, given a secret key SK f for a property f , one can test f on the plaintexts via a joint decryption of the corresponding ciphertexts.
Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We start by presenting our definitions for multiinput functional encryption in Section 2. Next, in Section 3, we recall the definitions for various cryptographic primitives used in our constructions. We then present our constructions for multiinput functional encryption in Section 4 and Section 5. In Section 6, we show how to construct general obfuscation from multi-input functional encryption and also provide impossibility results for SIM-secure MI-FE. Finally, we discuss how to extend our positive results to handle randomized functionalities in Section 7.
Multi-Input Functional Encryption
In this work, we study functional encryption for n-ary functions, where n > 1 (and in general, a polynomial in the security parameter). In other words, we are interested in encryption schemes where the owner of a "master" secret key can generate special keys SK f that allow the computation of f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) from n ciphertexts CT 1 , . . . , CT n corresponding to messages x 1 , . . . , x n , respectively. We refer to such an encryption scheme as multi-input functional encryption. Analogously, we will refer to the existing notion of functional encryption (that only considers single-ary functions) as single-input functional encryption.
Intuitively, while single-input functional encryption can be viewed as a specific (non-interactive) way of performing two-party computation, our setting of multi-input functional encryption captures multiparty computation. Going forward with this analogy, we are interested in modeling the general scenario where the n input ciphertexts are computed by n different parties. This raises the following two important questions:
1. Do the parties (i.e., the encryptors) share the same encryption key or do they use different encryption keys EK i to compute input ciphertexts CT i .
Are the encryption keys secret or public?
As we shall see, these questions have important bearing on the security guarantees that can be achieved for multi-input functional encryption.
Towards that end, we present a general, unified syntax and security definitions for multiinput functional encryption. We consider encryption systems with n encryption keys, some of which may be public, while the rest are secret. When all of the encryption keys are public, then this represents the "public-key" setting, while when all the encryption keys are secret, then this represents the "secret-key" setting. Looking ahead, we remark that our modeling allows us to capture the intermediary cases between these two extremes that are interesting from the viewpoint of the security guarantees possible.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. We first present the syntax and correctness requirements for multi-input FE in Section 2.1). Then, in Section 2.2, we present our security definitions for multi-input FE.
Syntax
Throughout the paper, we denote the security parameter by k.
A multi-input functional encryption scheme FE for F consists of four algorithms (FE.Setup, FE.Enc, FE.Keygen, FE.Dec) described below.
• Setup FE.Setup(1 k , n) is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the security parameter k and the function arity n. It outputs n encryption keys EK 1 , . . . , EK n and a master secret key MSK.
• Encryption FE.Enc(EK, x) is a PPT algorithm that takes as input an encryption key EK i ∈ (EK 1 , . . . , EK n ) and an input message x ∈ X k and outputs a ciphertext CT.
In the case where all of the encryption keys EK i are the same, we assume that each ciphertext CT has an associated label i to denote that the encrypted plaintext constitutes an i'th input to a function f ∈ F k . For convenience of notation, we omit the labels from the explicit description of the ciphertexts. In particular, note that when EK i 's are distinct, the index of the encryption key EK i used to compute CT implicitly denotes that the plaintext encrypted in CT constitutes an i'th input to f , and thus no explicit label is necessary.
• Key Generation FE.Keygen(MSK, f ) is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the master secret key MSK and an n-ary function f ∈ F k and outputs a corresponding secret key SK f .
is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a secret key SK f and n ciphertexts CT i , . . . , CT n and outputs a string y ∈ Y k .
Definition 1 (Correctness). A multi-input functional encryption scheme FE for F is correct if for all f ∈ F k and all (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X n k :
where the probability is taken over the coins of FE.Setup, FE.Keygen and FE.Enc.
Security for Multi-Input Functional Encryption
We now present our security definitions for multi-input functional encryption. Following the literature on single-input FE, we consider two notions of security, namely, indistinguishabilitybased security (or IND-security, in short) and simulation-based security (or SIM-security, in short).
Notation. We start by introducing some notation that is used in our security definitions. Let N denote the set of positive integers {1, . . . , n} where n denotes the arity of functions. For any two sets S = {s 0 , . . . , s |S| } and I = {i 1 , . . . , i |I| } such that |I| ≤ |S|, we let S I denote the subset {s i } i∈I of the set S. Throughout the text, we use the vector and set notation interchangeably, as per convenience. For simplicity of notation, we omit explicit reference to auxiliary input to the adversary from our definitions.
Indistinguishability-based Security
Here we present an indistinguishability-based security definition for multi-input FE.
Intuition. We start by giving an overview of the main ideas behind our indistinguishabilitybased security definition. To convey the core ideas, it suffices to consider the case of 2-ary functions. We will assume familiarity with the security definitions for single-input FE. Let us start by considering the natural extension of public-key single-input FE to the twoinput setting. That is, suppose there are two public encryption keys EK 1 , EK 2 that are used to create ciphertexts of first inputs and second inputs, respectively, for 2-ary functions. Let us investigate what security can be achieved for one pair of challenge message tuples (x 0 1 , x 0 2 ), (x 1 1 , x 1 2 ) for the simplified case where the adversary makes secret key queries after receiving the challenge ciphertexts.
Suppose that the adversary queries secret keys for functions {f }. Now, recall that the INDsecurity definition in the single-input case guarantees that an adversary cannot differentiate between encryptions of x 0 and x 1 as long as f (x 0 ) = f (x 1 ) for every f ∈ {f }. We note, however, that an analogous security guarantee cannot be achieved in the multi-input setting. That is, restricting the functions {f } to be such that f (
is not enough since an adversary who knows both the encryption keys can create its own ciphertexts w.r.t. each encryption key. Then, by using the secret key corresponding to function f , it can learn additional values
, then the adversary can learn the challenge bit b! Therefore, we must enforce additional restrictions on the query functions f . Specifically, we must require that f (
). Note that this restriction "grows" with the arity n of the functions. Let us now consider the secret-key case, where all the encryption keys are secret. In this case, for the above example, it suffices to require that f (x 0 1 , x 0 2 ) = f (x 1 1 , x 1 2 ) since the adversary cannot create its own ciphertexts. Observe, however, that when there are multiple challenge messages, then an adversary can learn function evaluations over different "combinations" of challenge messages. In particular, if there are q challenge messages per encryption key, then the adversary can learn q 2 output values for every f . Then, we must enforce that for every i ∈ [q 2 ], the i'th output value y 0 i when challenge bit b = 0 is equal to the output value y 1 i when the challenge bit b = 1.
The security guarantees in the public-key and the secret-key settings as discussed above are vastly different. In general, we observe that the more the number of encryption keys that are public, the smaller the class of functions that can be supported by the definition. Bellow, we present a unified definition that simultaneously captures the extreme cases of public-key and secret-key settings as well as all the "in between" cases.
Compatible Functions and Input Plaintexts. To facilitate the presentation of our
IND security definition, we first introduce the following notion:
. We say that F and ( X 0 , X 1 ) are I-compatible if they satisfy the following property:
• For every f ∈ {f }, every I = {i 1 , . . . , i t } ⊆ I ∪ ∅, every j 1 , . . . , j n−t ∈ [q], and every
where y i1 , . . . , y in denotes a permutation of the values y i1 , . . . , y in such that the value y ij is mapped to the 'th location if y ij is the 'th input (out of n inputs) to f .
IND-secure MI-FE.
Our security definition is parameterized by two variables t and q, where t denotes the number of encryption keys known to the adversary, and q denotes the number of challenge messages per encryption key. Thus, in total, the adversary is allowed to make Q = q ·n number of challenge message queries. We are now ready to present our formal definition for (t, q)-IND-secure multi-input functional encryption.
Definition 3 (Indistinguishability-based security). We say that a multi-input functional encryption scheme FE for for n-ary functions F is (t, q)-IND-secure if for every PPT adversary
In the above experiment, we require:
• Let {f } denote the entire set of key queries made by A 1 . Then, the challenge message vectors X 0 and X 1 chosen by A 1 must be I-compatible with {f }.
• The key queries {g} made by A 2 must be I-compatible with X 0 and X 1 .
Selective Security. We also consider selective indistinguishability-based security for multiinput functional encryption. Formally, (t, q)-sel-IND-security is defined in the same manner as Definition 3, except that the adversary A 1 is required to choose the challenge message vectors X 0 , X 1 before the evaluation keys EK and the master secret key MSK are chosen by the challenger. We omit the formal definition to avoid repetition.
Simulation-based Security
Here we present a simulation-based security definition for multi-input FE. We consider the case where the adversary makes key queries after choosing the challenge messages. That is, we only consider adaptive key queries. The "opposite" case where the adversary makes key queries before choosing the challenge messages (i..e, non-adaptive key queries) is discussed in Section D. Our definition extends the simulation-based security definition for single-input FE that supports adaptive key queries[BSW11, O'N10, BO13, CIJ + 13]. In particular, we present a general definition that models both black-box and non-black-box simulation.
Intuition. We start by giving an overview of the main ideas behind our simulation-based security definition. To convey the core ideas, it suffices to consider the case of 2-ary functions. Let us start by considering the natural extension of public-key single-input FE to the two-input setting. That is, suppose there are two public encryption keys EK 1 , EK 2 that are used to create ciphertexts of first inputs and second inputs, respectively, for 2-ary functions. Let us investigate what security can be achieved for one challenge message tuple (x 1 , x 2 ).
Suppose that the adversary queries secret keys for functions {f }. Now, recall that the SIMsecurity definition in the single-input case guarantees that for every f ∈ {f }, an adversary cannot learn more than f (x) when x is the challenge message. We note, however, that an analogous security guarantee cannot be achieved in the multi-input setting. Indeed, an adversary who knows both the encryption keys can create its own ciphertexts w.r.t. each encryption key. Then, by using the secret key corresponding to function f , it can learn additional values {f (x 1 , ·)} and {f (·, x 2 )}. Thus, we must allow for the ideal world adversary, aka simulator, to learn the same information.
In the secret-key case, however, since all of the encryption keys are secret, the SIM-security definition for single-input FE indeed extends in a natural manner to the multi-input setting. We stress, however, that when there are multiple challenge messages, we must take into account the fact that adversary can learn function evaluations over all possible "combinations" of challenge messages. Our definition presented below formalizes this intuition.
SIM-secure MI-FE. Similar to the IND-security case, our definition is parameterized by variables t and q as defined earlier. We now formally define (t, q)-SIM-secure multi-input functional encryption.
Definition 4 (Simulation-based Security). We say that a functional encryption scheme FE for n-ary functions F is (t, q)-SIM-secure if for every PPT adversary A = (A 0 , A 1 , A 2 ), there exists a PPT simulator S = (S 0 , S 1 , S 2 ) such that the outputs of the following two experiments are computationally indistinguishable:
where the oracle TP(M, ·, ·) denotes the ideal world trusted party, {f } denotes the set of queries of A 2 to FE.Keygen and {g} denotes the set of functions appearing in the queries of S 2 to TP. Given the message distribution M, TP first samples a message vector X ← M , where X = {x 1,j , . . . , x n,j } q j=1 . It then accepts queries of the form g, (j 1 , . . . , j n−p ) ,
On receiving such a query, TP outputs:
where y i1 , . . . , y in denotes a permutation of the values y i1 , . . . , y in such that the value y ij is mapped to the 'th location if y ij is the 'th input (out of n inputs) to g.
However, when t > 0, then the real adversary can compute values:
FE.Dec SK f , CT i1,j1 , . . . , CT in−t,jn−t , CT i 1 , . . . , CT i t for ciphertexts CT i of its choice since it knows the encryption keys EK I . In other words, such an adversary can learn function values of the form f x i1,j1 , . . . , x in−t,jn−t , ·, . . . , · . Thus, we must provide the same ability to the simulator as well. Our definition presented above precisely captures this.
Selective Security. We also consider selective simulation-based security for multi-input functional encryption. Formally, (t, q)-sel-SIM-security is defined in the same manner as Definition 4, except that in the real world experiment, adversary A 1 chooses the message distribution M before the evaluation keys EK and the master secret key MSK are chosen by the challenger. We omit the formal definition to avoid repetition.
Remark 6 (SIM-security: Secret-key setting). When t = 0, none of the encryption keys are known to the adversary. In this "secret-key" setting, there is no difference between (0, q)-sel-SIMsecurity and (0, q)-SIM-security.
Preliminaries
Here we present definitions of various cryptographic primitives that are used in our construction of multi-input functional encryption. We assume familiarity with standard semantically-secure public-key encryption and omit its formal definition from this text. Below, we recall the notions of indistinguishability obfuscation, non-interactive witness indistinguishable proof systems and perfectly binding commitment schemes.
Indistinguishability Obfuscation
Here we recall the notion of indistinguishability obfuscation that was defined by Barak et al.
[BGI + 01]. Intuitively speaking, we require that for any two circuits C 1 and C 2 that are "functionally equivalent" (i.e., for all inputs x in the domain, C 1 (x) = C 2 (x)), the obfuscation of C 1 must be computationally indistinguishable from the obfuscation of C 2 . Below we present the formal definition following the syntax of [GGH + 13a].
Definition 7 (Indistinguishability Obfuscation). A uniform PPT machine iO is called an indistinguishability obfuscator for a circuit class {C k } if the following holds:
• Correctness: For every k ∈ N, for every C ∈ C k , for every input x in the domain of C, we have that
• Indistinguishability: For every k ∈ N, for all pairs of circuits C 0 , C 1 ∈ C k , if C 0 (x) = C 1 (x) for all inputs x, then for all PPT adversaries A, we have: Differing-Inputs Obfuscation. We also consider a stronger notion of indistinguishability obfuscation, namely, differing-inputs obfuscation that was proposed by Barak et al [BGI + 01]. Intuitively speaking, we require that for any two circuits C 1 and C 2 that "appear" to be functionally equivalent to every PPT algorithm (i.e., no PPT algorithm can find an input x s.t. C 1 (x) = C 2 (x)), the obfuscation of C 1 must be computationally indistinguishable from the obfuscation of C 2 . Alternatively, if a PPT algorithm can distinguish obfuscation of C 1 from obfuscation of C 2 , then we can efficiently find an input x s.t. C 1 (x) = C 2 (x).
Below, we present the formal definition. We follow the formalism of [ABG + 13].
We start by defining the notion of differing-inputs circuit family. Intuitively. a circuit family is said to be a differing-inputs circuits family if there does not exist any PPT adversary that given two circuits, that are sampled from a distribution defined on this circuit family, can find an input x such that both the circuits yield different outputs on x.
Definition 8 (Differing-Inputs Circuit Family). A circuit family C associated with a sampler Sampler is said to be a differing-inputs circuit family if for every PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that:
Definition 9 (Differing-Inputs Obfuscator). A PPT machine diO is called a differing-inputs obfuscator for a differing-inputs circuits family C = {C k } if the following conditions are satisfied:
• Correctness: For all security parameters k ∈ N, for all C ∈ C, for all inputs x, we have that:
• Differing-inputs: For any PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that the following holds: For all security parameters k ∈ N, for (C 0 , C 1 , z) ← Sampler(1 k ), we have that:
|Pr [A (diO (C 1 )) = 1] − Pr [A (diO (C 2 )) = 1]| ≤ negl(k).
Non-Interactive Proof Systems
In this section, we recall various security notions for non-interactive proof systems. We start by giving the syntax and formal definition of a non-interactive proof system. Next, we give the definition of non-interactive witness-indistinguishable proofs (NIWI). Finally, we give the definition of non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK), with simulation-soundness property.
Syntax. Let R be an efficiently computable relation that consists of pairs (x, w), where x is called the statement and w is the witness. Let L denote the language consisting of statements in R. A non-interactive proof system for a language L consists of a setup algorithm CRSGen, a prover algorithm Prove and a verifier algorithm Verify, defined as follows:
• Setup CRSGen(1 k ) is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the security parameter k and outputs a common reference string crs.
• Prover Prove(crs, x, w) is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the common reference string CRS, a statement x along with a witness w. (x, w) ∈ R; if so, it produces a proof string π, else it outputs fail.
• Verifier Verify(crs, x, π) is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the common reference string crs and a statement x with a corresponding proof π. It outputs 1 if the proof is valid, and 0 otherwise.
Definition 10 (Non-interactive Proof System). A non-interactive proof system for a language L with a PPT relation R is a tuple of algorithms (CRSGen, Prove, Verify) such that the following properties hold:
• Perfect Completeness: For every (x, w) ∈ R, it holds that Pr[Verify(crs, x, Prove(crs, x, w)) = 1] = 1
where crs ← CRSGen(1 k ), and the probability is taken over the coins of CRSGen, Prove and Verify.
• Statistical Soundness: For every adversary A, it holds that
If the soundness property only holds against PPT adversaries, then we call it an argument system.
Definition 11 (NIWI). We say that a non-interactive proof system (CRSGen, Prove, Verify) for a language L with a PPT relation R is witness-indistinguishable if for any triplet (x, w 0 , w 1 ) such that (x, w 0 ) ∈ R and (x, w 1 ) ∈ R, the distributions {crs, Prove(crs, x, w 0 )} and {crs, Prove(crs, x, w 1 )} are computationally indistinguishable, where crs ← CRSGen(1 k ).
Definition 12 (NIZK). A non-interactive proof system (CRSGen, Prove, Verify) for a language L with a PPT relation R is said to be zero knowledge if there exists a simulator Sim = (Sim.CRSGen, Sim.Prove) such that for all PPT adversaries A,
where S(crs, τ, x, w) = Sim.Prove(crs, τ, x) if (x, w) ∈ R and outputs fail otherwise.
Definition 13 (Simulation soundness). A NIZK proof system (CRSGen, Prove, Verify) for a language L with a PPT relation R is said to be simulation sound if for all PPT adversaries,
where x * is not in the list of queries made by A to Sim.Prove.
Commitment Schemes
A commitment scheme Com is a PPT algorithm that takes as input a string x and randomness r and outputs c ← Com(x; r). A perfectly binding commitment scheme must satisfy the following properties:
• Perfectly Binding: This property states that two different strings cannot have the same commitment. More formally, ∀x 1 = x 2 and r 1 , r 2 , Com(x 1 ; r 1 ) = Com(x 2 ; r 2 ).
• Computational Hiding: For all strings x 0 and x 1 (of the same length), for all PPT adversaries A, we have that:
We note that it is in fact sufficient to use a standard 2-round statistically binding scheme in our construction in Section 4. Note that such a commitment scheme can be based on one way functions. For simplicitly of exposition, however, we will present our construction using a non-interactive perfectly binding scheme.
A Construction from Indistinguishability Obfuscation
Let F denote the family of all efficiently computable (deterministic) n-ary functions. We now present a functional encryption scheme FE I for F. Assuming the existence of one-way functions and indistinguishability obfuscation for all efficiently computable circuits, we prove the following security guarantees for FE I : 1. For t = 0, and any q = q(k) such that qn n = poly(k), FE I is (0, q)-SIM-secure. 2 In this case, the size of the secret keys in FE I grows linearly with qn n . 2. For any t ≤ n and q = poly(k), FE I is (t, q)-sel-IND-secure. In this case, the size of the secret keys is independent of q.
Further, the size of each encryption key and ciphertext in FE I grows linearly with q. In Section 5, we give an efficient construction with "compact" encryption keys and ciphertexts, whose security is proven in the standard model.
Notation. Let (CRSGen, Prove, Verify) be a NIWI proof system. Let Com denote a perfectly binding commitment scheme. Let iO denote an indistinguishability obfuscator. Finally, let PKE = (PKE.Setup, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) be a semantically secure public-key encryption scheme. (See Section 3 for definitions of these notions.) We denote the length of ciphertexts in PKE by c-len = c-len(k). Let len = 2 · c-len.
We now proceed to describe our scheme FE I = (FE.Setup, FE.Enc, FE.Keygen, FE.Dec).
Setup FE.Setup(1 k ): The setup algorithm first computes a CRS crs ← CRSGen(1 k ) for the NIWI proof system. Next, it computes two key pairs -(pk 1 , sk 1 ) ← PKE.Setup(1 k ) and (pk 2 , sk 2 ) ← PKE.Setup(1 k ) -of the public-key encryption scheme PKE. Finally, it computes the following commitments:
For every i ∈ [n], the i'th encryption key EK i = crs, pk 1 , pk 2 , Z i,j 1 , Z i 2 , r i 2 where r i 2 is the randomness used to compute the commitment Z i 2 . The master secret key is set to be MSK = crs, pk 1 , pk 2 , sk 1 , Z i,j 1 , Z i 2 . The setup algorithm outputs (EK 1 , . . . , EK n , MSK).
Encryption FE.Enc(EK i , x): To encrypt a message x with the i'th encryption key EK i , the encryption algorithm first computes c 1 ← PKE.Enc(pk 1 , x) and c 2 ← PKE.Enc(pk 2 , x). Next, it computes a NIWI proof π ← Prove(crs, y, w) for the statement y = c 1 , c 2 , pk 1 , pk 2 , Z i,j 1 , Z i 2 :
• Either c 1 and c 2 are encryptions of the same message and Z i 2 is a commitment to 0, or
1 is a commitment to c 1 c 2 . A witness w real = (m, s 1 , s 2 , r i 2 ) for the first part of the statement, referred to as the real witness, includes the message m and the randomness s 1 and s 2 used to compute the ciphertexts c 1 and c 2 , respectively, and the randomness r i 2 used to compute Z i 2 . A witness w trap = (j, r i,j 1 ) for the second part of the statement, referred to as the trapdoor witness, includes an index j and the randomness r i,j 1 used to compute Z i,j 1 . The honest encryption algorithm uses the real witness w real to compute π. The output of the algorithm is the ciphertext CT = (c 1 , c 2 , π). Figure 1 . Note that G f has the master secret key MSK hardwired in its description.
Key Generation FE.Keygen(MSK, f ): The key generation algorithm on input f computes
2 be the statement corresponding to the proof string π i . If Verify(crs, y i , π i ) = 0, then stop and output ⊥. Otherwise, continue to the next step.
(c) Compute x i ← PKE.Dec(sk 1 , c i,1 ).
2. Output f (x 1 , . . . , x n ).
Figure 1: Functionality G f
The algorithm outputs SK f as the secret key for f .
Size of Function G f . In order to prove that FE I is (0, q)-SIM-secure (see Section 4.2), we require the function G f to be padded with zeros such that |G f | = |Sim.G f |, where the "simulated" functionality Sim.G f is described later in Figure 2 . In this case, the size of SK f grows linearly with qn n . Note, however, that such a padding is not necessary to prove (t, q)-sel-IND-security for FE I (see Section 4.1). Indeed, in this case, the secret keys SK f are independent of the number of message queries q made by the adversary. 
Proving sel-IND Security
We now prove that the proposed scheme FE I is (t, q)-sel-IND-secure for any t ≤ n.
Theorem 14. Let q = q(k) be a fixed poly(k). Then, assuming indistinguishability obfuscation for all polynomial-time computable circuits and one-way functions, the proposed scheme FE I is (t, q)-sel-IND-secure for any t ≤ n.
We prove the above theorem via a hybrid argument. We start by describing a sequence of hybrid experiments H 0 , . . . , H 10 , where experiment H 0 (resp., H 10 ) corresponds to the real world experiment with challenge bit b = 0 (resp., b = 1). We will prove that for every i, the outputs of experiments H i and H i+1 are computationally indistinguishable.
Hybrid H 0 : This is the real experiment with challenge bit b = 0.
Hybrid H 1 : This experiment is the same as H 0 except that the setup algorithm computes the commitments {Z i,j 1 } in the following manner: let the challenge ciphertextĈT i,j = (ĉ i,j 1 ,ĉ i,j 2 ,π i,j ).
Hybrid H 2 : This experiment is the same as H 1 except that in every challenge ciphertext CT i,j = (ĉ i,j 1 ,ĉ i,j 2 ,π i,j ), the proof stringπ i,j is computed using the trapdoor witness.
Hybrid H 3 : This experiment is the same as H 2 except that for every i ∈ N \ I (where I denotes the set of indices i s.t. EK i is known to the adversary) the setup algorithm computes Z i 2 as a commitment to 1 (instead of 0). That is, for every i ∈ [n], Z i 2 ← Com(1).
Hybrid H 4 : This experiment is the same as H 3 except that in every challenge ciphertext CT i,j = (ĉ i,j 1 ,ĉ i,j 2 ,π i,j ), the second ciphertextĉ i,j 2 is computed as an encryption of the challenge message x 1 i,j (as opposed to x 0 i,j ), i.e.,ĉ i,j 2 ← FE.Enc(EK i , x 1 i,j ).
Hybrid H 5 : This experiment is the same as H 4 except that for every key query f , the corresponding secret key SK f is computed as SK f ← iO(G f ) where G f is the same as the function G f except that:
1. It has secret key sk 2 hardwired instead of sk 1 .
2. It decrypts the second component of each input ciphertext using sk 2 . More concretely, in step 1(c), plaintext x i is computed as x i ← PKE.Dec(sk 2 , c i,2 ).
Hybrid H 6 : This experiment is the same as H 5 except that in every challenge ciphertext
Hybrid H 7 : This experiment is the same as H 6 except that for every key query f , the
Hybrid H 8 : This experiment is the same as H 7 except that the setup algorithm computes every Z i 2 as a commitment to 0, i.e., Z i 2 ← Com(0).
Hybrid H 9 : This experiment is the same as H 8 except that in every challenge ciphertext CT i,j = (ĉ i,j 1 ,ĉ i,j 2 ,π i,j ), the proof stringπ i,j is computed using the real witness.
Hybrid H 10 : This experiment is the same as H 9 except that the setup algorithm computes every Z i,j 1 as a commitment to the all zeros string, i.e., Z i,j 1 ← Com(0 len ). Note that this is the real experiment with challenge bit b = 1.
This completes the description of the hybrids. We argue their indistinguishability in Appendix A.
Proving SIM Security
Here we prove that the proposed scheme FE I is (0, q)-SIM-secure.
Theorem 15. Let q = q(k) be such that qn n = poly(k). Then, assuming indistinguishability obfuscation for all polynomial-time computable circuits and one-way functions, the proposed scheme FE I is (0, q)-SIM-secure.
In order to prove the above theorem, we first construct an ideal world adversary aka simulator S. Then, in Appendix B, we prove indistinguishability of the outputs of the real and ideal world experiments via a hybrid argument.
Simulator S. We describe a simulator S = (S 0 , S 1 , S 2 ) that only makes black-box use of a real-world adversary A = (A 0 , A 1 , A 2 ).
Algorithm S 0 . Let z be the auxiliary input given to S. Algorithm S 0 simply runs A 0 with auxiliary input z and outputs (I, st 0 ) ← A 0 (1 k , z). Since we are only considering the case where t = 0, we have that I = ∅.
Algorithm S 1 . Algorithm S 1 simply runs A 1 on input st 0 and outputs (M, st 1 ) ← A 0 (st 0 ).
Algorithm S 2 . This algorithm runs the adversary algorithm A 2 on simulated ciphertexts and provides simulated answers to the key queries made by A 2 . More concretely, S 2 runs in the following sequence of steps:
1. Simulate Setup. S 2 first performs a simulated setup procedure. Namely, it first computes a CRS crs ← CRSGen(1 k ) for the NIWI proof system. Next, it computes two key pairs -(pk 1 , sk 1 ) ← PKE.Setup(1 k ) and (pk 2 , sk 2 ) ← PKE.Setup(1 k ) -of the public-key encryption scheme PKE. Finally, it computes the commitments {Z i,j 1 } and {Z i 2 } in the following manner:
1 be the randomness used to compute Z i,j 1 .. • For every i ∈ [n], compute Z i 2 as a commitment to 1, i.e., Z i 2 ← Com(1). Let MSK = crs, pk 1 , pk 2 , sk 1 , Z i,j 1 , Z i 2 .
Simulate Challenge Ciphertexts. S 2 now computes simulated challenge ciphertexts CT =
{ĈT 1,j , . . . ,ĈT n,j } q j=1 in the following manner. For every i ∈ [n], j ∈ [q]:
. Compute the proofπ i ← Prove(crs, y i,j , w i,j ) where the witness w i,j corresponds to the trapdoor witness (j, r i,j 1 ). That is, w i,j establishes that Z i,j 1 is a commitment toĉ i,j 1 ĉ i,j 2 . • The simulated ciphertextĈT i,j = (ĉ i,j 1 ,ĉ i,j 2 ,π i,j ). 3. Simulate Key Queries. Finally, S 2 runs the adversary algorithm A 2 on input ( CT, st 1 ).
Recall from Definition 4 that A 2 also makes queries to the key generation oracle. S 2 simulates responses to A 2 's key queries in the following manner. Let TP denote the ideal world trusted party that given the message distribution M (output by S 2 ) first samples X ← M , where X = {x 1,j , . . . , x n,j } q j=1 . When A 2 makes a key query f , S 2 performs the following sequence of steps:
• Query the trusted party TP on function (f, j 1 , . . . , j n ) for every choice of j 1 , . . . , j n ∈
[q]. The trusted party computes and returns the function outputs out[j 1 , . . . , j n ] = f (x 1,j1 , . . . , x n,jn } to S 2 . Let out denote the vector of all the q n number of outputs. • Compute the secret key SK f for function f as SK f ← iO(Sim.G f ). The functionality
Sim.G f has the master secret key MSK, the challenge ciphertext pairs {ĉ i,j 1 ,ĉ i,j 2 } and the outputs out hardwired in it. It is described in Figure 2 .
Finally, at some point A 2 outputs its view α. S 2 outputs α and stops.
In Appendix B, we prove indistinguishability of the outputs of the real and ideal experiments.
A Construction from Differing-Inputs Obfuscation
Let F denote the family of all efficiently computable (deterministic) n-ary functions. We now present a new functional encryption scheme FE II for F based on differing-inputs obfuscation.
Sim.G f (CT 1 , . . . , CT n ) 1. For every i ∈ [n]:
• Parse CT i = (c i,1 , c i,2 , π i ).
• Let y i = c i,1 , c i,2 , pk 1 , pk 2 , Z i,j 1 , Z i 2 be the statement corresponding to the proof string π i . If Verify(crs, y i , π i ) = 0, then stop and output ⊥. Otherwise, continue to the next step. ∃ (j 1 , . . . , j n ) s.t. for every i ∈ [n],
If
•ĉ i,ji 1 = c i,1 , and
then stop and output out[j 1 , . . . , j n ].
Otherwise, for every i ∈ [n],
• Compute x i ← PKE.Dec(sk 1 , c i,1 ).
4. Output f (x 1 , . . . , x n ).
Figure 2: Functionality Sim.G f
The main advantage of this scheme over the one presented in Section 4 is that the encryption keys and the ciphertexts are "compact", i.e., independent of the number of message queries q made by the adversary.
The proposed scheme provides the following security guarantees:
• For any choice of t ≤ n, FE II is (t, poly(k))-IND-secure. In this case, the number of message queries q can be an arbitrary unbounded polynomial q = poly(k).
• For t = 0 and q = q(k) such that qn n = poly(k), our construction naturally extends to (0, q)-SIM-security. In this case, the size of the secret keys grows linearly with qn n .
Notation. Let (CRSGen, Prove, Verify) be a simulation-sound NIZK argument system. Let
Com denote a perfectly binding commitment scheme. Let diO denote a differing-inputs obfuscator. Finally, let PKE = (PKE.Setup, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) be a semantically secure public-key encryption scheme. We now proceed to describe the scheme FE II = (FE.Setup, FE.Enc, FE.Keygen, FE.Dec).
Setup FE.Setup(1 k ): The setup algorithm first computes a CRS crs ← CRSGen(1 k ) for the simulation-sound NIZK proof system. Next, it computes two key pairs -(pk 1 , sk 1 ) ← PKE.Setup(1 k ) and (pk 2 , sk 2 ) ← PKE.Setup(1 k ) -of the public-key encryption scheme PKE. Finally, for every i ∈ [n], it computes a commitment Z i ← Com(0). For every i ∈ [n], the i'th encryption key EK i = (crs, pk 1 , pk 2 , Z i , r i ) where r i is the randomness used to compute Z i . The master secret key MSK = (crs, pk 1 , pk 2 , sk 1 , {Z i }). The setup algorithm outputs (EK 1 , . . . , EK n , MSK).
Encryption FE.Enc(EK i , x): To encrypt a message x with the i'th encryption key EK i , the encryption algorithm first computes c 1 ← PKE.Enc(pk 1 , x) and c 2 ← PKE.Enc(pk 2 , x). Next, it computes a simulation-sound NIZK proof π ← Prove(crs, y, w) for the statement y = (c 1 , c 2 , pk 1 , pk 2 , Z):
• c 1 and c 2 are encryptions of the same message and Z i is a commitment to 0.
Here, a witness w = (s 1 , s 2 , r i ) for y consists of the randomness s 1 and s 2 used to compute c 1 and c 2 , respectively, and the randomness r i used to compute Z i .
The output of the algorithm is the ciphertext CT = (c 1 , c 2 , π).
Key Generation FE.Keygen(MSK, f ): The key generation algorithm on input f computes Figure 3 . Note that H f has the master secret key MSK hardwired in its description.
(b) Let y i = (c i,1 , c i,2 , pk 1 , pk 2 , {Z i }) be the statement corresponding to the proof string π i . If Verify(crs, y i , π i ) = 0, then stop and output ⊥. Otherwise, continue to the next step.
Figure 3: Functionality H f
Size of Function H f . Similar to the construction in Section 4, in order to prove that FE II is (0, q)-SIM-secure, we require the function H f to be padded with zeros such that the size of H f is equal to the size of its "simulated version" which has (among other things) qn n output values hardwired in it. Thus, in this case, the size of SK f grows linearly with qn n . Note, however, that such a padding is not necessary to prove (t, q)-sel-IND-security for FE II . Indeed, in this case, the secret keys SK f are independent of the number of message queries q made by the adversary.
Decryption FE.Dec(SK f , CT 1 , . . . , CT n ): The decryption algorithm on input (CT 1 , . . . , CT n ) computes and outputs SK f (CT 1 , . . . , CT n ).
This completes the description of FE II . The correctness property of the scheme follows from inspection.
Theorem 16. Assuming differing-inputs obfuscation for all polynomial-time computable circuits and one-way functions, the proposed scheme FE II is (t, poly(k))-IND-secure for any t ≤ n.
We prove the above theorem in Appendix C. Further, we note that for t = 0 and q = q(k) such that qn n = poly(k), our IND-security proof can be naturally extended to argue (0, q)-SIMsecurity for FE II by using a similar simulation strategy as for our first construction (see Section 4). We formally state the claim below, but omit the proof details from this manuscript.
Theorem 17. Let q = q(k) be such that qn n = poly(k). Then, assuming differing-inputs obfuscation for all polynomial-time computable circuits and one-way functions, the proposed scheme FE II is (0, q)-SIM-secure.
Multi-Input Functional Encryption Implies Obfuscation
In this section, we prove that various flavors of multi-input FE imply well established notions of program obfuscation.
Indistinguishability Obfuscation from MI-FE. Our first result shows that the indistinguishability notion of multi-input FE unconditionally implies indistinguishability obfuscation (note that such an implication is not known to hold for single input FE). This, in particular, means that the use of indistinguishability obfuscation is unavoidable for multi-input FE, and, any future improvements in the complexity assumptions on which multi-input FE is based will only come with a corresponding improvement in the indistinguishability obfuscation constructions. We state the theorem below for the "weakest" case of secret-key multi-input functional encryption (this only strengthens our result).
Theorem 18. (0, 2)-IND-secure MI-FE for general (k+1)-ary functions unconditionally implies indistinguishability obfuscation for all circuits with k-bit inputs.
Proof. We describe how to construct indistinguishability obfuscation for a circuit class C where for every C ∈ C, C : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} k and |C| = . Let FE be a (0, 2)-IND-secure MI-FE scheme for general (k + 1)-ary functions. The PPT obfuscator iO works as follows.
• Consider a function g s.t. g(x 1 , . . . , x k , C) = C(x 1 || . . . ||x k ) where for all i, x i ∈ {0, 1}, and, C ∈ {0, 1} . Observe that the function g acts as a universal circuit and treats its (k + 1)-th input as a circuit.
• The obfuscator iO first runs the setup algorithm for FE to compute a master secret key MSK and encryption keys as EK 1 , . . . , EK k+1 . It then runs the key generation algorithm of FE to generate a secret key for the function g using MSK. Denote the resulting decryption key as SK g .
. All the encryptions are performed using independent random coins. Furthermore, let CT k+1 ← FE.Enc(EK k+1 , C).
• The obfuscated circuit iO(C) = ({CT b i } b,i , CT k+1 , SK g ). To evaluate the obfuscated circuit on an input x = (x 1 , . . . , x k ), simply evaluate the decryption algorithm FE.Dec(SK g , {CT xi i } i , CT k+1 ). This results in g(x 1 , . . . , x k , C) = C(x). This completes the description of the obfuscation scheme.
We now show that the above construction is indeed a secure indistinguishability obfuscation. This follows from the (0, 2)-IND-security of the underlying multi-input FE scheme. Consider any two functionally equivalent circuit C 0 and C 1 from C. That is, for all x ∈ {0, 1} k , C 0 (x) = C 1 (x). Now, suppose for contradiction that there exists a PPT adversary A that distinguishes between iO(C 0 ) and iO(C 1 ) with non-negligible advantage. We will construct an adversary B that breaks (0, 2)-IND-security of FE. The adversary B runs A and receives circuits C 0 and C 1 . It works as follows:
1. It defines challenge message vectors X 0 and X 1 , where
B sends over X 0 , X 1 to the challenger in the IND security game. Let {CT 1,j , . . . , CT k+1,j } j∈[2] denote the challenge ciphertexts received by B 2. Next, B requests a secret key for the function g. Let SK g be the secret key received by B.
3. Now, B sends over {CT 1,j , . . . , CT k,j } j∈[2] , CT k+1,1 as the challenge obfuscation to A.
B simply outputs the guess b returned by A.
This completes the description of B. We first argue that the challenge message vectors and the secret key query g are I-compatible as per IND security definition 3. (Here I = ∅.) To see this, note that for any x = (x 1 , . . . , x k ), we have that:
g(x 1 , . . . , x k , C 0 ) = g(x 1 , . . . , x k , C 1 ). since C 0 and C 1 are functionally equivalent. Now, note that if the challenge bit b chosen by IND-security game challenge is equal to 0, then the resulting obfuscation is sent by B to A is of circuit C 0 ; otherwise it is an obfuscation of C 1 . Thus, if A can distinguish between these two cases with non-negligible advantage, then B also wins the IND game with the same advantage. This completes the proof.
Remark 19. We remark that in the above proof, the "order" of the key query g is irrelevant.
That is, g could be queried before or after the ciphertext queries.
Virtual Black-Box Obfuscation from MI-FE. We now give two results for constructing virtual black-box obfuscation from various flavors of MI-FE. We first note that the same construction as above (Theorem 18), in fact, implies virtual black-box obfuscation, when FE is (0, 2)-SIM-secure.
Theorem 20. (0, 2)-SIM-secure FE for general (k + 1)-ary functions unconditionally implies virtual black-box obfuscation for all circuits with k-bit inputs.
Next, we show that SIM-secure multi-input FE, where at least one of the encryption keys may be made public, implies virtual black-box obfuscation.
Theorem 21.
(1, 1)-SIM-secure MI-FE for general 2-ary functions unconditionally implies virtual black-box obfuscation for all circuits.
Sketch. The proof of this theorem is quite similar to that of the previous one and we only provide a sketch here. The basic idea, as before, is to give out keys for a universal circuit g. The first input to g will be the function f which we wish to obfuscate. The encryption key EK 1 will be kept a secret, and, the ciphertext FE.Enc(EK 1 , f ) will be included as part of the obfuscated circuit. The second input x will be the input on which the user wishes to evaluate f . Hence, the user is given access to the second encryption key EK 2 (as part of the obfuscated circuit) to enable it to encrypt any x. More details follow:
• Consider a function g s.t. g(C, x) = C(x). Let FE be a (1, 1)-SIM-secure MI-FE for general 2-ary functions. The obfuscator VBB runs the setup algorithm for FE to compute MSK and encryption keys (EK 1 , EK 2 ). It then runs the key generation algorithm of FE to generate a secret key SK g for the above function g using MSK.
• Let CT ← FE.Enc(EK 1 , C). The obfuscated circuit VBB(C) = (CT, EK 2 , SK g ).
To evaluate the obfuscated circuit on an input x, compute CT ← FE.Enc(EK 2 , x), and, run FE.Dec(SK g , CT, CT ). This results in g(C, x) = C(x). The virtual black-box obfuscation property follows from the fact that the view of the user can be simulated given access to a trusted party holding the first input f , and, evaluating g(f, ·) on any second input x of user's choice.
Impossibility Results for SIM secure MI-FE
Here, we discuss some impossibility results for simulation secure MI-FE that complement our positive results given in Sections 4 and 5.
Recall that [BSW11, BO13] already establish the impossibility of (0, poly(k))-SIM-secure functional encryption for 1-ary functions. We show that for n-ary functions, where n ≥ 2, the situation is much worse. In particular, recall that Barak et al. [BGI + 01] proved an (unconditional) impossibility result for VBB obfuscation for general circuits. Then, combining their result with Theorem 21, we get the following result:
Theorem 22. (1, 1)-SIM-secure multi-input functional encryption for general 2-ary functions is impossible.
We remark that our positive results for SIM-secure MI-FE in Sections 4 and 5 are consistent with the above negative result and that of [BSW11, BO13] .
Simulation secure MI-FE against Non-Adaptive Key Queries. So far in this paper, we have only considered simulation security for MI-FE in the setting where an adversary makes key queries after choosing the challenge messages. Following the terminology from the literature on single-input functional encryption, such queries are referred to as adaptive key queries. One can consider the "opposite" scenario, where the adversary is allowed to make key queries before choosing the challenge messages. This setting has been well studied in the case of single-input functional encryption, where such queries are referred to as non-adaptive key queries.
We now discuss the feasibility of simulation-based security for non-adaptive key queries (referred to as NA-SIM security) in our setting of multi-input FE. NA-SIM security for multiinput FE is defined similarly to definition 4, except that now the adversary is required to make key queries before (as opposed to after) choosing the challenge messages. More concretely, we can define (t, p, q)-NA-SIM-secure functional encryption where (as earlier) t denotes the number of encryption keys known to the adversary and q denotes the number of challenge messages per encryption key. The new parameter p denotes the total number of non-adaptive key queries by the adversary. For completeness, we provide a formal definition in Appendix D. Now, observe that the proofs of Theorem 21 and Theorem 20 are insensitive to the "order" of the key query; i.e., they go through even if the key query is non-adaptive. Then, combining these results with the impossibility result of Barak et al [BGI + 01], we obtain the following two (incomparable) results:
Theorem 23. (1, 1, 1) -NA-SIM-secure multi-input functional encryption for general 2-ary functions is impossible.
Theorem 24. (0, 1, 2)-NA-SIM-secure multi-input functional encryption for general (k + 1)-ary functions is impossible.
We remark that we have stated Theorem 24 for the secret-key setting (as opposed to for general t) since it is the "weakest" case, and therefore only strengthens our result.
While the above impossibility results rule out achieving NA-SIM-security for general functions -in particular, they rule out NA-SIM-security for the arguably unnatural function that cannot be VBB obfuscated [BGI + 01]) -we also provide another impossibility result for the weak pseudorandom function.
Let {F } be a weak pseudo-random function family with key space K and message space X. The 2-ary wPRF(·, ·) functionality on input key k ∈ K and message x ∈ X outputs F K (x). We shall call k as the first input and x to be the second input to wPRF. We claim the following:
Theorem 25. (0, 1, poly(k))-NA-SIM-secure functional encryption for the weak PRF functionality wPRF(·, ·) is impossible.
Proof. (Sketch). Here, we sketch a proof for black-box simulation. The proof follows along the same lines as in [AGVW13] . Suppose for contradiction that there exists a (0, 1, poly(k))-NA-SIM-secure functional encryption FE for the weak PRF functionality. Let − 1 denote an upper bound on the ciphertext size in FE. We construct an adversary A that makes a single key query and 2 number of message queries (per encryption key) such that every (black-box) simulator "fails" to simulate the view of A.
The adversary A first makes a single (non-adaptive) key query for the 2-ary function wPRF. Let L = 2 . Then, A asks ciphertexts for L first inputs k 1 , . . . , k L and L second inputs x 1 , . . . , x L , where each k i is chosen uniformly at random from the key space K and each x i is chosen uniformly at random from the message space X. Now the simulator first needs to produce a key SK wPRF and then it is given the functionality's outputs {wPRF (k i , x j )} L,L i=1,j=1 . Now, the simulator has to produce 2L ciphertexts CT 1
. Thus, on the one hand, the simulator needs to "encode" all of the functionality's outputs into 2L ciphertexts. On the other hand, the functionality's outputs are L 2 = 4 pseudo-random bits, while the total length of the 2L ciphertexts is 2L( − 1) < 2 3 bits. Since a pseudo-random string cannot be efficiently compressed, we get a contradiction.
Discussion. Recall that the lower bounds of [AGVW13, CIJ + 13] already establish that it is impossible to achieve (0, poly(k), 1)-NA-SIM-secure functional encryption for 1-ary functions (specifically, the weak PRF functionality). That is, it is impossible to achieve NA-SIM security against an unbounded number of non-adaptive key queries even in the secret-key setting. Our impossibility results in Theorem 24 and Theorem 25 establish that it is also impossible to achieve NA-SIM security against an unbounded number of ciphertext queries. Thus, NA-SIM secure MI-FE is only possible for a bounded number of key queries and a bounded number of ciphertext queries. This is strictly worse that what can be achieved in the case of SIM security (where unbounded number of key queries can be achieved, in the secret-key setting, as exemplified by our positive results).
Extension to Randomized Functionalities
Our positive results for multi-input functional encryption presented in Sections 4 and 5 only concern with deterministic n-ary functions. Here, we discuss how to extend our results to handle randomized functionalities.
Modeling Security. In the single-input setting, the case of randomized functionalities was recently considered by Goyal et al. [GJKS13] . Very briefly, Goyal et al. observed that in the setting of randomized functionalities, the central challenge is to ensure that the random coins used for computing a function output are unbiased and remain hidden from the participants (i.e., the encryptor/sender and the decryptor/receiver). As such, in addition to requiring security against dishonest receivers, one must explicitly require security against dishonest senders to ensure that it is not possible to force "bad" outputs on an honest receiver.
We follow the same approach in our multi-input setting. Specifically, following [GJKS13] , below we formalize a definition for security against dishonest senders. Overall, we will say that a multi-input functional encryption scheme for a randomized function family is secure if it achieves security against both dishonest senders and dishonest receivers.
Definition 26 (Security against Dishonest Senders). We say that a functional encryption scheme FE for n-ary (randomized) functions F is t-secure against dishonest senders if for every PPT adversary A = (A 0 , A 1 , A 2 ), there exists a PPT simulator S = (S 0 , S 1 , S 2 ) such that the outputs of the following two experiments are computationally indistinguishable:
where,
• In the real world, oracle O {SK f } , CT, · accepts queries of the form (CT * 1 , . . . ,
Here, z i1 , . . . , z in denotes a permutation of the ciphertexts z i1 , . . . , z in such that z ij is mapped to the 'th location if z ij is the encrypted via the encryption key EK . Further, {out} denotes the set of outputs of O to A 2 's decryption queries.
• In the ideal world, the trusted party TP ({f } , x, ·) accepts queries of the form (x * 1 , . . . , x * t ) and outputs f j x i1 , . . . , x in−t , x * 1 , . . . , x * t ; r j for every f j ∈ {f }. Here r j is chosen uniformly at random and z i1 , . . . , z in denotes a permutation of the values z i1 , . . . , z in such that the value z ij is mapped to the 'th location if z ij is the 'th input (out of n inputs) to f . Further, {out } denotes the set of outputs of TP to the queries of S 2 .
We now define SIM security for multi-input functional encryption for randomized functions. We note that IND security can be defined analogously; we skip the details.
Definition 27. We say that a functional encryption scheme FE for n-ary (randomized) functions F is (t 1 , t 2 , q)-SIM-secure if:
1. FE is t 1 -secure against dishonest senders. 2. FE is (t 2 , q)-SIM-secure against dishonest receivers.
Positive Results for Randomized Functionalities. Building on the techniques of [GJKS13] , both of our constructions for multi-input functional encryption presented in Sections 4 and 5 can be extended to handle randomized functionalities. Below, we outline the necessary modifications to our second scheme FE II to define a new scheme FE. (We note that FE I can be modified in a similar manner to handle randomized functionalities.)
FE is defined similarly to FE II , with the following necessary changes:
1. To encrypt a message x, we follow the same steps as in FE II to compute (c 1 , c 2 , π). Next, we sample a key pair (sk, vk) for a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme. The final ciphertext CT consists of (c 1 , c 2 , π, vk, σ), where σ is a signature over c 1 c 2 π using sk. 2. To compute a secret key SK f for a (randomized) function f , we first sample a key K for a puncturable pseudo-random function (PRF) [SW13, BW13, BGI13, KPTZ13]. Then, key SK f is computed as diO(H f ) where H f is defined similarly to the functionality H f except that:
• We additionally check whether the signature σ i in each input ciphertext CT i is valid.
• Further, after decrypting each input ciphertext CT i to compute x i , we first compute randomness r as the output of the PRF on input CT 1 . . . CT n using key K. The final output is then computed as f (x 1 , . . . , x n ; r).
Very briefly, security against dishonest senders follows from the same ideas as in [NY90, DDN91, Sah99] . Specifically, incorporating the one-time signatures in the ciphertexts ensures that each ciphertext is unique (and therefore, an adversary cannot modify an honest sender's ciphertext to create a decryption query). Further, it is possible to extract the input from an adversarially created ciphertext using one of the secret keys (while using the semantic security for the other key). Security against dishonest receivers follows largely in the same manner as for FE II . The main difference now is that (as in [GJKS13] ), we use the punctured PRF to remove all the secret information in the PRF key for the pointĈT 1 . . . Ĉ T n , whereĈT 1 , . . . ,ĈT n denotes a challenge ciphertext tuple. From the security of the obfuscation, it follows that this randomness remains hidden from a honest receiver. We refer the reader to [GJKS13] for more details on the proof. Proof. Recall that the only difference between H 3 and H 4 is the manner in which the second ciphertextsĉ i,j 2 in the challenge ciphertextsĈT i,j are computed: in H 3 ,ĉ i,j 2 is an encryption of the challenge message x i,j , while in H 4 ,ĉ i,j 2 is an encryption of 0. Further, note that neither the randomness s i,j 2 used to computeĉ i,j 2 , nor the secret key sk 2 is used anywhere else in the experiment. Then, by a standard hybrid argument, the indistinguishability of H 3 and H 4 follows from the semantic security of PKE.
Lemma 32 (H 4 c ≡ H 5 ). Assuming that iO is an indistinguishability obfuscator, Com is perfectly binding and (CRSGen, Prove, Verify) is a proof system, the outputs of the experiments H 4 and H 5 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. We prove the lemma for the simplified case where the adversary makes a single key query f . We remark that by a standard hybrid argument, the proof can be easily extended to the more general case where the adversary makes poly(k) number of key queries. Now, note that the only difference between H 4 and H 5 is the manner in which the secret key SK f for the key query f is computed: in experiment H 4 , SK f is an indistinguishability obfuscation of G f , while in H 5 , SK f is an indistinguishability obfuscation of Sim.G f . Now, if G f and G f have the same output behavior on all input points, then the computational indistinguishability of H 4 and H 5 follows immediately from the indistinguishability of iO(G f ) and iO(G f ). Thus, all that remains to prove is that for all inputs z, G f (z) = G f (z).
Towards that end, we first assume without loss of generality that the encryption scheme PKE = (PKE.Setup, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) does not have any decryption error. We make the following claim:
Proof. Let z = (CT 1 , . . . , CT n ) be any input to G f and G f . For every i ∈ [n], let CT i = (c i,1 , c i,2 , π i ). Note that both Sim.G f and Sim.G f output ⊥ on input z iff there exists i ∈ [n] such that Verify(crs, y i , π i ) = 0, where y i = (c i,1 , c i,2 , pk 1 , pk 2 , {Z i,j 1 }, Z i 2 ) is the statement corresponding to the NIWI proof π i . The claim follows.
Following the above claim, we shall call an input z to G f and G f to be a valid input if G f (z) = ⊥ (and G f (z) = ⊥). We now demonstrate that the outputs of G f and G f differ on a valid input z only if z satisfies some specific properties. Later, we will rely on the binding property of Com and the statistical soundness of the NIWI proof system to show that such an input z does not exist, thus completing the proof.
Claim 34. Let {ĈT 1,j , . . . ,ĈT n,j } q j=1 denote the challenge ciphertexts given to the adversary, where everyĈT i,j = (ĉ i,j 1 ,ĉ i,j 2 ,π i,j ). Then, for every valid input z = (CT 1 , . . . , CT n ) to G f and G f such that G f (z) = G f (z), there exists i ∈ [n], CT i = (c i,1 , c i,2 , π i ) in z such that one of the following two cases holds:
Case 1: If i ∈ I, then c i,1 and c i,2 are encryptions of different messages, and for every j ∈ [q], eitherĉ i,1 =ĉ i,j 1 or c i,2 =ĉ i,j 2 . Case 2: If i ∈ N \ I, then for every j ∈ [q], either c i,1 =ĉ i,j 1 or c i,2 =ĉ i,j 2 .
Proof. Suppose that the claim is false. That is, there exists a valid input z * = (CT * 1 , . . . , CT * n ) such that G f (z * ) = G f (z * ), yet z satisfies the following conditions:
Condition A: For every i ∈ I, CT * i = (c * i,1 , c * i,2 , π * i ) is such that:
1. Either there exists j i ∈ [q] such that c * i,1 =ĉ i,ji 1 and c * i,2 =ĉ i,ji 2 , or 2. c * i,1 and c * i,2 are encryptions of the same message. Let x i denote this message. Condition B: For every i ∈ N\I, CT * i = (c * i,1 , c * i,2 , π * i ), there exists j i ∈ [q] such that c * i,1 =ĉ i,ji 1 and c * i,2 =ĉ i,ji 2 . Let us inspect the outputs of G f and G f on the input z * . We have that: according to their input positions in f . Now, let I ⊆ I be such that for every i ∈ I , CT * i = (c * i,1 , c * i,2 , π * i ) satisfies the condition A(2). Thus, for every i ∈ I \ I , CT * i = (c * i,1 , c * i,2 , π * i ) satisfies the condition A(1). Then, we have:
where X 0 = {x 0 1,j , . . . , x 0 n,j } q j=1 and X 1 = {x 1 1,j , . . . , x 1 n,j } q j=1 are the challenge messages. Now, it follows from the I-Compatibility property in the IND-security definition (see Definition 3) that G f (z * ) = G f (z * ), which is a contradiction.
Completing the proof of Lemma 32. We now prove that for every valid input z, G f (z) = G f (z). For the sake of contradiction, suppose not. That is, let z * be a valid input such that G f (z * ) = G f (z * ). Following Claim 34, fix i ∈ [n], CT * i = (c * i,1 , c * i,2 , π * i ) in z * to be such that either Case 1 or Case 2 holds.
First observe that since z * is a valid input, we have that Verify(crs, y * i , π * i ) = 1, where y * i = (c * i,1 , c * i,2 , pk 1 , pk 2 , {Z i,j 1 }, Z i 1 ) is the statement corresponding to the proof string π * i . Then, since (CRSGen, Prove, Verify) is a statistically sound proof system, it follows that the statement y * i must be true, i.e., either there exists a real witness or a trapdoor witness for y * i (see Section 4 for the definitions of real and trapdoor witnesses). We now consider the two cases: Case 1. i ∈ I: Since c * i,1 and c * i,2 are encryptions of different messages, there does not exist a real witness for y * i . Then, suppose that there exists a trapdoor witness w trap = (j, r i,j 1 ) for y * i . That is, suppose that ∃j ∈ [q] and randomness r i,j 1 such that Z i,j 1 = Com(c * i,1 , c * i,2 ; r i,j 1 ). However, note that in experiments H 4 and H 5 , Z i,j 1 is computed as a commitment toĉ i,j 1 ĉ i,j 2 . Since Com is perfectly binding and either c * i,1 =ĉ i,j 1 or c * i,2 =ĉ i,j 2 , we obtain a contradiction. Case 2. i ∈ N \ I: First observe that since Z i 2 is computed as a commitment to 1 in experiments H 4 and H 5 , it follows from the perfect binding property of Com that there does not exist a real witness for y * i . Then, suppose that there exists a trapdoor witness w trap = (j, r i,j 1 ) for y * i . That is, suppose that ∃j ∈ [q] and randomness r i,j 1 such that Z i,j 1 = Com(c * i,1 , c * i,2 ; r i,j 1 ). However, note that in experiments H 4 and H 5 , Z i,j 1 is computed as a commitment toĉ i,j 1 ĉ i,j 2 . Since Com is perfectly binding and either c * i,1 =ĉ i,j 1 or c * i,2 =ĉ i,j 2 , we obtain a contradiction. Proof. We prove the lemma for the simplified case where the adversary makes a single key query f . By a standard hybrid argument, our proof can be easily extended to the more general case where the adversary makes poly(k) number of key queries. Now, note that the only difference between H 5 and H 6 is the manner in which the secret key SK f for the key query f is computed: in experiment H 5 , SK f is an indistinguishability obfuscation of Sim.G f , while in H 6 , SK f is an indistinguishability obfuscation of Sim.G f . Now, if Sim.G f and Sim.G f have the same output behavior on all input points, then the computational indistinguishability of H 5 and H 6 follows immediately from the indistinguishability of iO(Sim.G f ) and iO(Sim.G f ). Thus, all that remains to prove is that for all inputs z, Sim.G f (z) = Sim.G f (z).
Claim 42. For any input z, Sim.G f (z) = ⊥ iff Sim.G f (z) = ⊥.
Proof. Let z = (CT 1 , . . . , CT n ) be any input to Sim.G f and Sim.G f . For every i ∈ [n], let CT i = (c i,1 , c i,2 , π i ). Note that both Sim.G f and Sim.G f output ⊥ on input z iff there exists i ∈ [n] such that Verify(crs, y i , π i ) = 0, where y i = (c i,1 , c i,2 , pk 1 , pk 2 , {Z i,j 1 }, Z i 2 ) is the statement corresponding to the NIWI proof π i . The claim immediately follows.
Following the above claim, we shall call an input z to Sim.G f and Sim.G f to be a valid input if Sim.G f (z) = ⊥ (and Sim.G f (z) = ⊥). We make the following claim regarding valid inputs:
Claim 43. Let {ĈT 1,j , . . . ,ĈT n,j } q j=1 denote the challenge ciphertexts given to the adversary, where everyĈT i,j = (ĉ i,j 1 ,ĉ i,j 2 ,π i,j ). Let z = (CT 1 , . . . , CT n ) denote a valid input to Sim.G f and Sim.G f . Then, for every CT i = (c i,1 , c i,2 , π i ), there exists j i ∈ [q] s.t. c i,1 =ĉ i,ji 1 and c i,2 =ĉ i,ji 2 .
Proof. Suppose that the claim is false. That is, for a valid input z = (CT 1 , . . . , CT n ), ∃ CT i = (c i,1 , c i,2 , π i ) s.t. ∀ j ∈ [q], either c i,1 =ĉ i,j 1 or c i,2 =ĉ i,j 2 . Now, since z is a valid input, we have that Verify(crs, y i , π i ) = 1, where y i = (c i,1 , c i,2 , pk 1 , pk 2 , {Z i,j 1 }, Z i 2 ) is the statement corresponding to the NIWI proof π i . Then, since (CRSGen, Prove, Verify) is a statistically sound proof system, it follows that the statement y i must be true. We consider the following two cases:
Case 1: The ciphertexts c i,1 and c i,2 are encryptions of the same message and there exists randomness r i 2 s.t. Z 2 ← Com(0; r i 2 ). However, note that in experiments H 5 and H 6 , Z i 2 is computed as a commitment to 1. Since Com is a perfectly binding commitment scheme, we obtain a contradiction.
Case 2: ∃j ∈ [q] and randomness r i,j 1 such that Z i,j 1 = Com(c i,1 c i,2 ; r i,j 1 ). However, note that in experiments H 5 and H 6 , Z i,j 1 is computed as a commitment toĉ i,j 1 ĉ i,j 2 . Since Com is a perfectly binding commitment scheme and either c i,1 =ĉ i,j 1 or c i,2 =ĉ i,j 2 , we obtain a contradiction.
This completes the proof of the above claim.
Completing the proof of Lemma 41. Following Claim 42, we only need to prove that for every valid input z, Sim.G f (z) = Sim.G f (z). Now, let z = (CT 1 , . . . , CT n ) be any valid input to Sim.G f and Sim.G f . From Claim 49, we have that for every i ∈ [n], there exists j i ∈ [q] such that CT i =ĉ i,ji 1 ,ĉ i,ji 2 , π i . Then, note that on such an input z = (CT 1 , . . . , CT n ), both Sim.G f and Sim.G f output the same (programmed) value, i.e., out[j 1 , . . . , j n ].
This completes the proof of Lemma 41.
H f , while in H 5 , SK f is a differing-inputs obfuscation of H f . It follows that if there exists a PPT adversary A that distinguishes between the outputs of H 4 and H 5 with non-negligible probability, then we can construct a PPT adversary A that distinguishes between diO(H f ) and diO(H f ) with non-negligible probability. Then, it follows from Definition 9 that for such an adversary A , there exists a PPT extractor algorithm E that on input (H f , H f ) outputs an input value z * such that H f (z * ) = H f (z * ). We will use E to contradict the simulation-soundness property of the NIZK argument system (CRSGen, Prove, Verify).
Towards that end, let z * = (CT * 1 , . . . , CT * n ), where for every i ∈ [n], CT * i = (c * i,1 , c * i,2 , π * i ). Without loss of generality, we assume that every proof string π * i is accepting. This is because otherwise from the definition of H f and H f , we have that H f (z * ) = H f (z * ). We make the following claim about the input z * .
Claim 49. Let {ĈT 1,j , . . . ,ĈT n,j } q j=1 denote the challenge ciphertexts in experiments H 3 and H 4 , where everyĈT i,j = (ĉ i,j 1 ,ĉ i,j 2 ,π i,j ). Then, there exists i ∈ [n], CT * i = (c * i,1 , c * i,2 , π * i ) in z * such that one of the following two cases holds:
Case 1: If i ∈ I, then c * i,1 and c * i,2 are encryptions of different messages, and for every j ∈ [q], either c * i,1 =ĉ i,j 1 or c * i,2 =ĉ i,j 2 . Case 2: If i ∈ N \ I, then for every j ∈ [q], either c * i,1 =ĉ i,j 1 or c * i,2 =ĉ i,j 2 .
Proof. Suppose that the claim is false. That is, the input z * = (CT * 1 , . . . , CT * n ) output by E is such that:
Completing the proof of Lemma 48. Following the above claim, fix CT * i = (c * i,1 , c * i,2 , π * i ) in z * to be such that either Case 1 or Case 2 holds. Let y * i = (c * i,1 , c * i,2 , pk 1 , pk 2 , Z i ) be the statement corresponding to the proof string π * i . Further, letŷ i,j be the statement corresponding to the proof stringπ i,j in challenge ciphertext CT i,j = (ĉ i,j 1 ,ĉ i,j 2 ,π i,j ). We consider Case 1 and Case 2 separately. Case 1. Since c * i,1 and c * i,2 are encryptions of different messages, we have that the statement y * i is false. Further, since for all j ∈ [q], either c * i,1 =ĉ i,j 1 or c * i,2 =ĉ i,j 2 , we have that y * i =ŷ i,j . Then, we have that the output z * of the extractor algorithm E includes an accepting proof for a new, false statement y * i . This contradicts the simulation-soundness property of the NIZK argument system (CRSGen, Prove, Verify).
Case 2. Since Z i is computed as a commitment to 1 in experiments H 3 and H 4 , it follows from the perfect binding property of Com that the statement y * i is false. Further, since for all j ∈ [q], either c * i,1 =ĉ i,j 1 or c * i,2 =ĉ i,j 2 , we have that y * i =ŷ i,j . Then, we have that the output z * of the extractor algorithm E includes an accepting proof for a new, false statement y * i . This contradicts the simulation-soundness property of the NIZK argument system (CRSGen, Prove, Verify). Proof. The proof follows in the same manner as Lemma 46.
Lemma 53 (H 8 c ≡ H 9 ). Assuming that (CRSGen, Prove, Verify) is a NIZK argument system, the outputs of experiments H 8 and H 9 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. The proof follows in the same manner as Lemma 45.
Lemma 54 (H 9 c ≡ H 10 ). Assuming that (CRSGen, Prove, Verify) is a NIZK argument system, the outputs of experiments H 9 and H 10 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. The proof follows in the same manner as Lemma 44.
D NA-SIM-secure MI-FE NA-SIM security for multi-input FE is defined similarly to definition 4, except that now the adversary is required to make key queries before (as opposed to after) choosing the challenge messages. More concretely, we define (t, p, q)-NA-SIM-secure functional encryption where (as earlier) t denotes the number of encryption keys known to the adversary and q denotes the number of challenge messages per encryption key. The new parameter p denotes the total number of non-adaptive key queries by the adversary. Below, we present the formal definition.
Definition 55 (NA-SIM Security). We say that a functional encryption scheme FE for n-ary functions F is (t, p, q)-NA-SIM-secure if for every PPT adversary A = (A 0 , A 1 , A 2 ), there exists a PPT simulator S = (S 0 , S 1 , S 2 ) such that the outputs of the following two experiments are computationally indistinguishable: where {f } denote the queries of A 1 to FE.Keygen and {g } denote the functions appearing in the queries of S 2 to TP such that |{f }| = |{g }| = p. The oracle TP(M, ·, ·) denotes the ideal world trusted party that given the message distribution M, TP first samples a message vector X ← M , where X = {x 1,j , . . . , x n,j } q j=1 . It accepts input queries of the form (g, (j 1 , . . . , j n )) and outputs g(x 1,j1 , . . . , x n,jn ).
